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The implications of evolutionarily stable behavior in finite populations have 
recently been explored for a variety of aggregative games. This note proves an 
intimate relationship between submodularity and global evolutionary stability of 
strategies for these games, which -apart from being of independent interest - 
accounts for a number of results obtained in the recent literature: we show that 
any evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of a submodular aggregative game must 
also be globally stable. I.e. if one mutant cannot successfully invade a population, 
any number of mutants can even less do so. 
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The implications of evolutionarily stable behavior in ﬁnite populations are the sub-
ject of a very active ﬁeld of research in economics. Beginning with Schaﬀer (1989),
whose analysis was generalized by Vega-Redondo (1997), economists looked beyond
the popular perception of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) as a reﬁnement
of Nash equilibrium. This perception implicitly assumed an inﬁnite population of
potential players for the game under consideration. The theory of ESS for ﬁnite
populations provided by Schaﬀer(1988) shows, that it is precisely this inﬁnite popu-
lation assumption, which accounts for the general coincidence of ESS behavior and
symmetric Nash equilibrium. Without this assumption the two solution concepts
may propose diﬀerent solutions to the game. These diﬀerences and the relation of
the two solution concepts ESS and Nash Equilibrium in general have since been
explored for a variety of games in several recent contributions (see Al¯ os-Ferrer and
Ania (2004), Hehenkamp et al. (2004), Leininger (2002,2003), Possajennikov (2003)
and Schenk-Hopp¯ e (2000)). All these contributions analyse games, which belong to
the class of submodular aggregative games. The present note is concerned with a
general structural characteristic of this class of games, namely, that in these games
stability from an evolutionary point of view always means global stability: if a small
number of a mutant strategy cannot invade a given population, then neither can any
larger number of the same mutant strategy do so. This somewhat counterintuitive
conclusion is made precise by our Theorem in section 3. Section 1 presents the class
of submodular aggregative games, while section 2 provides the deﬁnition of ﬁnite
population ESS and its adaptation to the games under consideration. Section 4
applies our ﬁndings to an example from contest theory.
1 Submodular aggregative games
As in Al¯ os-Ferrer and Ania (2004) and Possajennikov (2003) we consider general-
ized aggregative games, which are symmetric. Symmetry means that all players
have identical strategy space S⊂ < and payoﬀ function Π. A game of n players
is aggregative (Corchon,1994), if this function only depends on the player’s own
strategy si and an aggregate g(s1,...,sn) ∈ < of all the stategies employed. Other
players behavior is only payoﬀ-relevant for player i through its inﬂuence on the ag-
gregate. We assume the aggregator function g to be monotonically increasing in all
components.
2Deﬁnition 1:
A (generalized) symmetric aggregative game is a game
Γ = (N,S1 × ... × Sn,Π1(s1,...,sn),...,Πn(s1,...,sn)) such that
i) Si = S ⊆ < for all i = 1,...,n
ii) Πi(s1,...,si,...,sn) = Π(si,s−i) for i = 1,...,n
where Π : Sn → < with Π(si,s−i) = Π(si,s0
−i)
for any permutation s0
−i of s−i.
iii) there exist g : Sn → < , increasing in all components, and
¯ Π : S × < → < such that Π(si,s−i) = ¯ Π(si,g(si,s−i))
for all (si,s−i) ∈ Sn and i ∈ {1,...,n}
The previous deﬁnition captures a large and economically important class of games
(see e.g. Possajennikov, 2003, Al¯ os-Ferrer and Ania, 2004, and Topkis, 1998, chapter
4). It contains Cournot games, rent-seeking contests, public-good provision games,
common resource extraction games, arms races and many others.
Aggregative n-player games reduce to the structure of a two-player game: for each
single player it is only payoﬀ- relevant what the value of the aggregate is, and not
what the actions of other players are. This enables the straightforward deﬁnition of
submodularity for these games.
Deﬁnition 2:
i) A generalized aggregative game Γ is submodular (in individual strategy and
the aggregate), if ¯ Π has decreasing diﬀerences; i.e. for all s0 ≥ s and g0 ≥ g
¯ Π(s0,g0) − ¯ Π(s,g0) ≤ ¯ Π(s0,g) − ¯ Π(s,g)
- or equivalently -
¯ Π(s0,g0) − ¯ Π(s0,g) ≤ ¯ Π(s,g0) − ¯ Π(s,g)
3ii) A generalized aggregative game Γ is strictly submodular (in individual
strategy and aggregate), if ¯ Π has strictly decreasing diﬀerences; i.e. for all
s0 > s and g0 > g
¯ Π(s0,g0) − ¯ Π(s,g0) < ¯ Π(s0,g) − ¯ Π(s,g)
Remark: It is well known (Topkis, 1998), that if ¯ Π is twice continuously diﬀeren-
tiable, then ¯ Π has decreasing diﬀerences if and only if ∂2¯ Π
∂g∂s ≤ 0 everywhere.
Hence it is fairly simple to check in this case, whether a game Γ is submodular.
In submodular games the individual incentive to increase one’s action (variable)
decreases with increasing aggregate; hence individual action and the aggregate of
(others) individual actions are strategic substitutes. This basic fact will be used to
understand global stability of evolutionary equilibrium in these games. Since evo-
lutionary stability in ﬁnite populations is closely linked to maximization of relative
payoﬀ (see the next section), we will read submodularity of the absolute payoﬀ func-
tion ¯ Π of a player as a statement about his relative payoﬀ function. For symmetric
aggregative games the latter is a diﬀerence of ¯ Π in the sense of Deﬁnition 2. De-
creasing diﬀerences of ¯ Π mean, that the relative payoﬀ of a strategy s0 against any
smaller strategy s decreases with increasing values of aggregate g.
2 Evolutionarily stable strategies
We follow Schaﬀer (1988), who adapted the well-known notion of an evolutionarily
stable strategy (ESS) due to Maynard Smith (1974) to ﬁnite populations of
interacting agents.
A strategy is evolutionarily stable, if a whole population using that strategy cannot
be invaded by a suﬃciently small group of ”mutants” using another strategy.
Obviously, in the context of ﬁnite populations of n players the smallest meaningful
number of mutants is one. This motivates the following deﬁnition: let the strategy
s be adapted by all players i, i = 1, ..., n. A mutant strategy s0 6= s can invade s,
if the payoﬀ for a single player using s0 (against the (n-1) other players using s) is
strictly higher than the payoﬀ of a player using s (against (n-2) other players using
s and the mutant using s0). A strategy s∗ is then called evolutionarily stable, if it
cannot be invaded by any other strategy.
Note that the comparison of payoﬀs implied by the above deﬁnition requires a
symmetric game; i.e. a game satisfying i) and ii) of Deﬁnition 1. More formally,
4Deﬁnition 3:
Let Γ be a symmetric game. A strategy s∗ is an ESS, if for all s ∈ S
(*) Π(s∗;s,s∗,...,s∗) ≥ Π(s;s∗,...,s∗)
s∗ is a strict ESS, if the inequality is a strict one.
If Γ is also aggregative, then (*) reads
¯ Π(s∗;g(s,s∗,...,s∗)) ≥ ¯ Π(s,g(s,s∗,...,s∗)) for all s ∈ S
As observed by Schaﬀer (1988) this means, that an ESS is a strategy s∗ with the
property
s










Hence s∗ corresponds to the Nash equilibrium of the game, in which players
maximize relative (not absolute) payoﬀ. This -in the usual way- can be found by
looking for a ﬁxed point of the best response correspondence, which in the case of
symmetric games is just given by the above: it is the correspondence, that assigns
to each strategy s the set of maximizers of the relative pay-oﬀ function (identical
to all players), which results from all other players using s.
The Nash equilibrium of the game with relative payoﬀ functions (i.e. ESS of
the game with absolute payoﬀ functions) need not correspond to a Nash equilibrium
of the game with absolute payoﬀs; hence the well-known reﬁnement property of
ESS for inﬁnite player populations does not hold in the context of ﬁnite player
populations. E.g. Hehenkamp et al. (2004) show that for a certain class of
submodular aggregative games, namely Tullock contests, ESS and Nash equilibrium
always diﬀer (and the former exists if and only if the latter exists). It always pays
for a player to increase eﬀort in an ESS beyond the Nash eﬀort level, because such a
(marginal) increase will lower an opponent’s pay-oﬀ by more than it lowers his own.
This form of spiteful behavior (Hamilton,1970) can even lead to overdissipation of
the contested rent in an ESS.
An important strengthening of the ESS requirement -also due to Schaﬀer (1988)-
demands additional stability against several identical mutants:
5Deﬁnition 4:
An ESS s∗ is called (strictly) M-stable, if a population of n players using
s∗ cannot be invaded by m mutants, who all use s 6= s∗, for 1 ≤ m ≤ M











for all s ∈ S and m ∈ {1,...,M}
s∗ is called (strictly) globally stable, if it is (strictly) (n-1)-stable.
Strictly globally stable ESS of ﬁnite population games have the important property
of being the unique stable limit points of stochastic dynamic adjustment processes,
which arise from imitation and experimentation behavior of players (see Schenk-
Hopp¯ e (2000) and Al¯ os-Ferrer and Ania (2004)). I.e. such strategies are the long-
run outcome, if boundedly rational players behave in this way. Note, again, that











for all s ∈ S and m ∈ {1,...,M}
3 The Result
We now prove that for submodular aggregative games the notions of evolutionary
stability (ESS) and global evolutionary stability (global ESS) coincide; i.e. in
these games stability against invadibility by one mutant implies stability against
invadibility by any number of mutants! This somewhat counterintuitive property
follows from submodularity in these games: suppose a strategy s∗ is an ESS; i.e.
s∗ is stable against a single mutant. If we now, in addition, require stability of
s∗ against invasion by two mutants, we extend the non-invadibility condition to
a population, in which one incumbent strategy s∗ has been substituted for an
additional mutant strategy. A larger (smaller) mutant strategy, which replaces
a incumbent strategy, will unambiguously increase (decrease) the aggregate of
individual actions for all players. Submodularity then means that an incumbent
strategy player’s best response is to decrease (increase) his action. So the mutant
strategy is always caught ”wrong-footed” (i.e. as lying on the ”wrong side” of the
6incumbent strategy): it cannot do better than s∗ with two copies, if it hasn’t done
so before with just a single copy.
More precisely, we prove
Theorem:
Let Γ be a (strictly) submodular generalized aggregative game.
Then any ESS of Γ is (strictly) globally stable.
Proof:
Let s∗ ∈ S be an ESS of Γ; i.e. it holds that
(1) ¯ Π(s∗,g(s,s∗,...,s∗)) ≥ ¯ Π(s,g(s,s∗,...,s∗)) for all s ∈ S




z}|{ ... ,s,s∗,...,s∗)) ≥ ¯ Π(s,g(s,
m
z}|{ ... ,s,s∗,...,s∗))
for all s ∈ S and all m = 1...,n − 1
We will use aggregativeness and the decreasing diﬀerences-property of ¯ Π to infer
that if (2) holds for m ∈ {1,...,n − 2} than it must hold for (m+1) as well. I.e. we
have to show that
(C) ¯ Π(s∗,g(s,
m+1
z}|{ ... ,s,s∗,...,s∗)) − ¯ Π(s,g(s,
m+1
z}|{ ... ,s,s∗,...,s∗)) ≥ 0
for all s ∈ S.










because of monotonicity of g.





















from this it follows that
































z}|{ ... ,s,s∗,...,s∗)) ≥ ¯ Π(s,g(s,
m
z}|{ ... ,s,s∗,...,s∗))
because of our induction hypothesis (IH).
This proves (C) for (m+1)mutants s.
































































z}|{ ... ,s,s∗,...,s∗)) − ¯ Π(s∗,g(s,
m
z}|{ ... ,s,s∗,...,s∗)) ≤ 0 because of our in-
duction hypothesis (IH). This again yields (C).
This proves the theorem. Our proof by induction generalizes Theorem 4 in
Hehenkamp et al. (2004) from the context of Tullock contests to the entire class of
submodular aggregative games.
8Note, that our Theorem does not require an ESS to be a strict ESS to infer its
global stability properties. An obvious Corollary, which directly follows from our
method of proof, hence is
Corollary:
Let Γ be a submodular generalized aggregative game.
Then any strict ESS is strictly globally stable.
Our result is similar, yet diﬀerent and of deeper nature, to that of Al¯ os-Ferrer and
Ania (2004). They show, that it is submodularity of an aggregative game that ac-
counts for the fact, that an aggregate-taking equilibrium must be a globally stable
ESS. They use this fact to show existence of (globally stable) ESS via existence of
an aggregate-taking equilibrium. Our result shows, that as far as global stability of
an ESS is concerned this detour (via the notion of an aggregate-taking equilibrium)
is neither necessary nor as general as our direct approach. E.g. for the example of
rent-seeking contests presented below our Theorem implies existence of a globally
stable ESS for parameter ranges, that imply non-existence of an aggregate-taking
equilibrium.
The Theorem also gives a unifying account of results relating to the stochastic stabil-
ity of ﬁnite population ESS. Vega-Redondo (1997) and -in more generality- Schenk-
Hopp¯ e (2000) show, that in Cournot games only ESS are selected as invariant states
by certain explicitly dynamic and stochastic models of the evolutionary process.
Al¯ os-Ferrer and Ania (2004) use a result of Ellison (2000) on stochastic stability to
prove, that a strictly globally stable ESS (if it exists) is the unique stochastically sta-
ble state of such evolutionary process. We now add the insight, that Vega-Redondo
(1997) and Schenk-Hopp¯ e (2000) derive their results from games, whose ESS’s are
in fact strictly globally stable. Invariant states in these models can hence be eas-
ily computed by applying relative payoﬀ maximization. Appendix 1 gives a slight
generalization.
4 An example: evolutionary rent-seeking
Tullock (1980) modelled competition for a rent of value V as a contest between n
players. All players expend eﬀort (or income) to obtain the rent, but only the winner
gets the entire rent while all expenditures are forfeited. If the contestants expend








and expected payoﬀ for player i is given by





· V − si
One can show that for r ≤ n
n−1 a unique ESS s∗ = r
n · V exists (Hehenkamp et al.
(2004), Theorem 2).














r · V − si
with g(s1,...,sn) strictly increasing in all its components.









2 < 0 for all si > 0
According to our Theorem the unique ESS then in fact must be strictly globally
stable. Note, that an aggregate-taking equilibrium only exists for r < 1 (Al¯ os-Ferrer
and Ania, 2004). So, proving existence of a globally stable ESS via existence of
an aggregate taking equilibrium for e.g. n = 2 only works, if r < 1, but a globally
stable ESS exists for all r ≤ 2. The direct proof of Hehenkamp et al. (2004),
which does not refer to submodularity, combined with our Theorem then reveals
the interplay between adding more and more mutants and the submodular payoﬀ
structure: Suppose m mutants have ”invaded” a population of n players, who all
used the ESS strategy s∗, with strategy ¯ s. This means that m ESS-players using s∗
have been replaced by m players using ¯ s in the n-player contest (m < n).
The relative payoﬀ function of one of the m mutants, Πm




M = ¯ Π(¯ s,g(¯ s,..., ¯ s,s
∗,...,s
∗)) − ¯ Π(s




¯ sr − s∗r
g(¯ s,..., ¯ s,s∗,...,s∗)r · V − (¯ s − s
∗) =
¯ sr − s∗r
[m · ¯ sr + (n − m)s∗r]
· V − (¯ s − s
∗)
Substituting yet another s∗-player for a mutant ¯ s then simply amounts to a change
of the aggregate variable g in the relative and absolute payoﬀ functions of all
players, mutants and ESS-strategists alike: if ¯ s > s∗ holds, g will increase to ¯ g;
likewise, if ¯ s < s∗, then g will decrease to ¯ ¯ g.
Since ¯ Π is strictly submodular and hence has strictly decreasing diﬀerences
(in individual strategy and aggregate) this means that
i) ¯ Π(¯ s, ¯ g) − ¯ Π(s∗, ¯ g) < ¯ Π(¯ s,g) − ¯ Π(s∗,g) if ¯ s > s∗
and so the relative payoﬀ of a mutant decreases, if the aggregate changes
from g to ¯ g > g. Consequently, if this relative payoﬀ has been negative before
(with just m mutants), it will be negative as well after the introduction of an
additional mutant;
ii) ¯ Π(s∗,g) − ¯ Π(¯ s,g) < ¯ Π(s∗,¯ ¯ g) − ¯ Π(¯ s,¯ ¯ g) if ¯ s < s∗
and so the relative payoﬀ of an ESS-strategist increases, if the aggre-
gate changes from g to ¯ ¯ g < g. If it has been positive before (with just
m mutants), it will also be positive after the introduction of an additional
mutant. Equivalently, the mutants relative payoﬀ decreases as before.
Hehenkamp et al. (2004) heuristically explained this result by treating m -the






¯ sr − s∗r
g(¯ s,..., ¯ s,s∗,...,s∗)r
#2
· V < 0 for all ¯ s 6= s
∗
We now see that the property of submodularity accounts for the minus sign in this
expression exclusively. Consequently, submodularity ensures that stability against
’small’ invasions is synonymous with stability against any invasion.
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We have read the property of decreasing diﬀerences of the pay-oﬀ function ¯ Π as a
property of the relative pay-oﬀ function ¯ Π(s0,g)− ¯ Π(s,g) to see its natural relation
to the property of an ESS, which has to maximize this relative pay-oﬀ. As stated
this is a cardinal property of ¯ Π. A well-known ordinal version of it is the socalled
single-crossing property, SCP.
Deﬁnition 5:
A generalized aggregative game Γ is quasi-submodular, if ¯ Π satisﬁes the
single-crossing property (SCP); i.e. for all s0 ≥ s and g0 ≥ g
¯ Π(s
0,g) − ¯ Π(s,g) ≤ 0 implies ¯ Π(s
0,g
0) − ¯ Π(s,g
0) ≤ 0
If all inequalities are strict ones, the game is strictly quasi-submodular.
Remark: If a game is submodular; i.e. has decreasing diﬀerences, then it is also
quasi-submodular; i.e. satisﬁes SCP:
if for all s0 ≥ s and g0 ≥ g we have that
¯ Π(s
0,g
0) − ¯ Π(s,g
0) ≤ ¯ Π(s
0,g) − ¯ Π(s,g)
then the latter diﬀerence being non-positive, of course, implies that the former
must be likewise. Clearly, decreasing diﬀerences of ¯ Π imply SCP of ¯ Π.
Our Theorem also holds under the weaker assumption of SCP for ¯ Π:
Theorem(ordinal version):
Let Γ be a (strictly) quasi-submodular generalized aggregative game.
Then any ESS of Γ is (strictly) globally stable.




∗)) ≥ ¯ Π(s,g(s,s
∗,...,s
∗)) for all s ∈ S.










∗)) for all s ∈ S.
We now want to show that the inequality will also hold for m+1 mutants by invoking
aggregativeness and (SCP).
14i) Suppose s∗ < s, then g(s,
m
z}|{ ... ,s,s∗,...,s∗) < g(s,
m+1






















ii) Suppose now that s∗ > s, then g(s,
m
z}|{ ... ,s,s∗,...,s∗) > g(s,
m+1
z}|{ ... ,s,s∗,...,s∗).























Analogously, it follows that if (SCP) holds strictly, then an ESS is strictly globally
stable. 2
Analogously, the Corollary generalizes:
Corollary(ordinal version):
Let Γ be a quasi-submodular generalized aggregative game.
Then any strict ESS is strictly globally stable.
15Appendix 2:
If one deﬁnes supermodularity of a generalized aggregative game Γ as ¯ Π having
increasing diﬀerences; i.e. for all s0 ≥ s and g0 ≥ g
¯ Π(s
0,g
0) − ¯ Π(s,g
0) ≥ ¯ Π(s
0,g) − Π(s,g),
and quasi-supermodularity as the property, for all s0 > s and g0 > g,
¯ Π(s
0,g) − ¯ Π(s,g) ≥ 0 implies ¯ Π(s
0,g
0) − ¯ Π(s,g
0) ≥ 0
then the following implication can be derived. Again, quasi-supermodularity is
implied by supermodularity; i.e. increasing diﬀerences of ¯ Π.
Lemma:
Let Γ be a (quasi-)supermodular generalized aggregative game. Then it
holds, that if a strategy s ∈ S is not m-stable, then it is not (m+1)-
stable. Equivalently, if s ∈ S is (m+1)-stable, then it is m-stable.
The Lemma shows, that the ”intuitive” inclusion, namely that if (m+1) mutants
cannot invade a population, then neither can only m mutants, is, in fact, tied to the
property of supermodularity, which expresses complementarity of s and g.
Our Theorem identiﬁes submodularity - and hence substitutability between s and
g - as the source of the ”unintuitive” reverse inclusion, namely that if m mutants
cannot invade, then neither can (m+1) mutants.
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